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TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND DEFAMATORY
SPEECH: A CASE FOR ESTABLISHING NORMS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
DAVID GOLDBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
“The development of radio broadcasting has obviously
created new problems of international relations not cov-
ered by existing law.”1
Transnational communication2 is not a novel phenomenon.
Despite recent concern over the consequences of communications
that respect no territorial boundary, such as satellite-delivered sig-
nals and computer-generated bytes, there is a long history of dis-
putes arising out of the cross-border (and inter-group)
dissemination of opinions, ideas, and information.  For example, in
the sixteenth century, Francisco de Victoria, commenting on Cath-
olic missionaries preaching to unwilling and endangered listeners,
asserted that if the Spaniards were prevented “from freely preach-
ing the Gospel, [they], after first reasoning with them in order to
remove scandal, may preach it despite their unwillingness . . . .”3
Emmerich de Vattel was somewhat more temperate, acknowledging
that “[i]t is certainly an uncharitable act, and indeed a vital injury
* David Goldberg teaches and researches media/information law at Glasgow
Caledonian and Stirling Universities, as well as at London as the Senior Honorary Visit-
ing Fellow, Institute of Computers and Communications Law, Queen Mary, and Oxford
as an Academic Associate, Programme for Comparative Media Law and Policy.
1. C.G. Fenwick, The Use of Radio as an Instrument of Foreign Propaganda, 32 AM. J.
INT’L L. 339, 339 (1938).
2. Transnational communication refers to all “communication across national
boundaries;” “international communication” is more “commonly confined to commu-
nication between governments.”  Quincy Wright, Freedom and Responsibility in Respect to
Trans-national Communication, 44 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 95 n.2 (1950).  Wright states
that the term “transnational communication” is preferable to “international
communication.”
3. Id. at 97 (quoting FRANCISCO DE VICTORIA, ON THE INDIANS 157 (Ernest Nys
ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1917)).
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to a Nation, to spread a false and dangerous doctrine among its
citizens.”4
Cross-border dissemination of ideas has also led to problems in
more recent times.  In the nineteenth century, conflicts arose when
newspapers published in one state were circulated in another state.
On occasion, the intrastate publication and circulation resulted in
problems, simply because the newspapers made critical comments
about goings-on in another state.5  In the twentieth century, the de-
velopment and use of the then “new media” — wireless radio —
occasioned a fresh catalyst for tension.  Radio’s use — some might
say its abuse — by states such as Germany, the USSR, and Italy,
heightened the tensions that were developing before the Second
World War.  It was during this period that the world’s first and only
treaty dealing explicitly with the standards for acceptable interna-
tional broadcasting was adopted: the International Convention Con-
cerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace (1936 Treaty).6
While so-called “new” information and communications tech-
nologies (ICTs) have created their own characteristic problems and
concerns, it must be remembered that all forms of communication
have at all times been capable of causing transnational/interna-
tional tension.  To illustrate this point by analogy: confining one’s
interest to the problems posed by the “new media” is akin to being
concerned about causes of conflict, but confining one’s interest to
nuclear weaponry and warfare.  Such a narrow focus would ignore
the fact that old-fashioned, conventional, and low-tech weaponry
and warfare still have great capacity to threaten everyone’s peace
and security.
This article makes several points.  First, all forms of communi-
cation have caused transnational tensions and legal problems; such
tensions and problems are not unique to the so-called “new media.”
Second, not only the form of communication, but also the genre of
programming, can create international tensions.  Indeed, it was a
“light entertainment” program that played a background role in
4. Id. (quoting 2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 133 (Charles G.
Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758)).
5. See INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF PROPAGANDA passim (Clark C. Havighurst ed.,
1967).
6. International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of
Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, 4319 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter 1936 Treaty].
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the drafting of the 1936 Treaty.7  Third, although the 1936 Treaty
was intended to deal with wireless/radio transmissions, it can argua-
bly be interpreted to cover later forms of media, such as broadcast
television.  Finally, despite the provisions of the 1936 Treaty, this
article contends that it has been ignored by the international com-
munity even as nations struggle to define the scope and meaning of
norms concerning the permissible content of international and
transnational communication.
This article proposes that many of the problems that arise from
the cross-border dissemination of ideas could be solved through a
global and collaborative effort by international jurists.  The task of
these scholars would be to critically appraise the 1936 Treaty to as-
sess its current validity, determine whether there are any other gen-
erally-applicable legal standards in this area, and propose a
(re)statement of such norms for the twenty-first century.
Part II of this article details the background, terms, and subse-
quent history of the 1936 Treaty.  Part III describes certain fact situ-
ations that raise questions about whether the provisions of the 1936
Treaty have any bearing on contemporary international law norms.
Finally, the conclusion presents a concrete, action-oriented sugges-
tion in terms of Resolution 26 of the 1948 UN Conference on Free-
dom of Information.
II. THE 1936 TREATY
A. Historical Events Leading Up to the 1936 Treaty
According to Bumpus and Skelt, the “first recorded use of ra-
dio for international broadcasting seems to have been in 1915 when
Germany provided a daily news report.”8  The USSR followed in the
early 1920s, Lenin having declared that radio was “a newspaper
without paper.”9  Domestic receivers, however, could pick up sig-
nals from elsewhere, even if they were not intended for reception in
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. BERNARD BUMPUS & BARBARA SKELT, SEVENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL BROAD-
CASTING, COMM. & SOC’Y NO. 14, 7 (UNESCO 1984), microformed on ERIC No. ED259417
(Educ. Res. Info. Ctr.).
9. Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR109.txt unknown Seq: 4 20-FEB-06 12:24
148 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
another country.  So, in that sense, “all broadcasting could be re-
garded, generally, as being international.”10
Not surprisingly, the new medium of radio spawned attempts
to control its use and to bring some technical order into interna-
tional broadcasting.  Thomas Grandin provided an early, compre-
hensive account, in which he described several such efforts: the
wavelength coordination conferences, such as in Washington D.C.
in 1927; the activities of the International Broadcasting Union,
which in 1925 “passed resolutions appealing to broadcasters and
governments to take every precaution against the use of the
microphone in a manner calculated to prejudice good interna-
tional relations;” bilateral anti-propaganda agreements; and, cru-
cially, the events that resulted in the 1936 Treaty.”11
Grandin’s view was that “[p]erhaps anti-propaganda bilateral
agreements can do more than anything else to regulate radio hostili-
ties.”12  For example, in 1931, Poland and Germany entered into an
agreement under which each undertook “to do everything in their
power to ensure that matter — whether political, religious, eco-
nomic, intellectual or artistic — broadcast from their stations shall
not compromise in any way the spirit of cooperation and good un-
derstanding which is necessary if broadcasting is to fulfill its mission
of drawing nations together.”13  The catalyst to this agreement
seems to have been the broadcast of events taking place at a circus
held somewhere in Germany.  During the show, clowns told anti-
Polish jokes, which led to an official protest from the Polish to the
German government and the negotiation of the treaty.
This agreement was one of the precursors to the 1936 Treaty.
It is interesting to note that the agreement was not brought about
by official efforts to de-stabilize the Polish state (or its ideology), but
by the antics of circus clowns.  This underscores the point that any
and all genres of programming can be troublesome or offensive
10. Id.
11. THOMAS GRANDIN, THE POLITICAL USE OF THE RADIO 90 (Arno Press & N.Y.
Times 1971) (1939). See also Mary Cawte, Making Radio Into a Tool for War (1996),
http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/96Cawte.pdf; Howard S. LeRoy, Treaty
Regulation for International Radio and Shortwave Broadcasting, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 719
(1938).
12. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
13. Id.
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and provoke international reaction.  While more attention is paid
to the negative impact of “serious” programming, the mass-appeal
of “light entertainment programs” has been, and in all likelihood
will continue to be, an increasing focus of concern and reaction
because of the international tension such programs are capable of
generating.  These programs tend to have larger audience shares
than news or current affairs programs, and also influence, to a
greater extent than straight news and current affairs programming,
how people in one territory perceive those living elsewhere.
B. The 1936 Treaty and the Signatory States
The 1936 Treaty was the result of a process that began during
the late 1920s.  Meetings were held in Berlin in 1929 and in Brus-
sels in 1930 under the auspices of the International Parliamentary
Conference of Commerce.  Following a Polish initiative, the World
Disarmament Conference also considered the matter in 1931.  The
Conference’s Political Commission and special Committee for
Moral Disarmament carried out studies between 1931 and 1933.14
Nothing practical resulted from these efforts.  Then in September
1936, the League of Nations organized an inter-governmental con-
ference15 because of the “serious cases in Europe. . .of radio as a
source of international disagreement flaring into open hostility.”16
The result of this conference was the drafting of the 1936 Treaty.
The 1936 Treaty was intended to prevent broadcasting from
being used “in a manner prejudicial to good international under-
standing” and to “utilise . . . the possibilities offered by this medium
of intercommunication for promoting better mutual understanding
between peoples.”17  The principal articles of the 1936 Treaty place
limits on the content of communications that a High Contracting
Party (HCP) could broadcast.18  For example, Article 1 of the 1936
14. Id.
15. Id. at 91-92.
16. WILLIAM J. WEST, TRUTH BETRAYED 31 (1987).
17. 1936 Treaty, supra note 6.
18. The HCPs included Albania, the Argentine Republic, Austria, Belgium, the
United States of Brazil, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Chile, Colombia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, France,
Greece, India, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the United States of Mexico, Norway, New Zea-
land, the Netherlands, Roumania, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and Uruguay. Id.
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Treaty prohibits transmissions that are “of such a character as to
incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with the
internal order or security of a territory of a High Contracting
Party.”19  Article 2 states that the HCPs must put measures into
place to ensure that transmissions do not constitute incitement to
war or acts likely to lead to war.20  Article 3 imposes recklessness
and negligence standards on the HCPs, prohibiting transmissions
“likely to harm good international understanding by statements the
correctness of which is or ought to have been known to the persons
responsible for the broadcast”21 and requiring the HCPs to rectify
the broadcast of prohibited transmissions at the “earliest possible
moment.”22  Article 4 states that the HCPs are required to ensure
that broadcasters verify and check the accuracy of any transmissions
concerning international relations.23  Under Article 6, the HCPs
are required to enact and enforce domestic legislation to impose
the 1936 Treaty’s restrictions on governmental or independent
broadcasters within the HCP’s state.24  In Article 7 the 1936 Treaty
prescribes the methods and procedures for resolving disputes
among HCPs.  The parties are required to battle out any disputes in
an arbitral or judicial forum.25  Also, “[b]efore having recourse to
the procedures . . . the High Contracting Parties may, by common
consent, appeal to the good offices of the International Committee
on Intellectual Co-operation, which would be in a position to con-
stitute a special committee for this purpose.”26
The 1936 Treaty was opened for signature on September 23,
1936, and it was signed by twenty-eight states, including the United
Kingdom (UK) and the USSR.  The Convention went into effect on
April 2, 1938, after it was ratified by Australia, Brazil, Denmark,
France, India, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the UK.  Notable
for their absences were Germany, the United States, Japan, and It-
aly.  Research of documents in the League of Nations archive in
19. Id. at art. 1.
20. Id. at art. 2.
21. Id. at art. 3.
22. Id.
23. Id. at art. 4.
24. Id. at art. 6.
25. Id. at art. 7.
26. Id.
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Geneva, however, reveals that Italy was a participant in the 1936 Dip-
lomatic Conference, but withdrew from the Conference that was
drafting the Treaty the day before its conclusion.  Several states en-
tered the Treaty with reservations.  Belgium and Spain reserved
their right to jam transmissions.  The USSR reserved its “right to
apply reciprocal measure to a country carrying out improper trans-
missions against it” pending “the conclusion of the procedure con-
templated in Article 7.”27  Further, the USSR stated that the Treaty
created no formal obligations between parties that do not have dip-
lomatic relations with one another.
Grandin concluded that the 1936 Treaty is “a weak convention,
but it does contain well-stated criteria, from an international point
of view, of what is and what is not the right kind of broadcasting.”28
The need for such a treaty, however, was clear:  “[G]overnments,
which in many parts of the world control radio, are in no mood
today for compromise.  Another world war is being prepared in the
ether, as well as in the armaments factories.”29
The 1936 Treaty had a wide range of effects, some of which
were specific to certain signatories and others more generally.  Ac-
cording to one historian,
[t]he [real significance] of the Convention lay more in
the spirit of its intent that in its effect.  The articles were
framed in such a way as to prohibit only manifestly serious
offenses . . . .  Moreover, France and the Soviet Union
were the only great power signatories.  The absence of the
two countries whose radio propaganda was at that time
causing the most serious international concern, Germany
and Italy, rendered the convention virtually
meaningless.30
27. International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of
Peace, Apr. 2, 1983, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinter
netbible/partII/treaty-1.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
28. GRANDIN, supra note 11, at 92. See also INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING COM- R
MUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION: A COLLECTION OF BASIC DOCUMENTS 169 (Edward W.
Ploman ed., 1982).
29. GRANDIN, supra note 11, at 93. R
30. Philip M. Taylor, Propaganda in International Politics, 1919-1939, in FILM & RA-
DIO PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR II 17, 31 (K.R.M. Short ed., 1983).  Taylor has also
written that:
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The Treaty also forced certain states to examine their adherence to
a strict conception of the free speech principle.  For example, the
UK signed and ratified the 1936 Treaty despite the fact that it
strained, nearly to the breaking point, the UK’s avowed policy of
not interfering with press and broadcasters’ discretion as to con-
tent.  This problem almost prevented the UK from joining the
treaty.31 West quotes a Foreign Office memorandum from Sir Regi-
nald Leeper, referring to Article 4, which states: “This [sic] would
raise a very big question with the BBC . . . the Foreign Office has to
walk very warily in seeming to censor News . . . If some control were
established over the BBC news the Government would have to con-
sider this aspect very carefully.”32  Nonetheless, the UK signed the
1936 Treaty on May 1, 1937, “knowing,” says West, “that the ques-
tion of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s broadcasts would
now become one of considerable seriousness; indeed, infringe-
ments rendered the Government liable to subsequent action of de-
tection or complaint.”33  In a similar vein, Downey commented:
“Articles 1, 3, and 5 specifically charged the signatory states with the
responsibility to control the content of broadcasts originating
within their borders . . . They should have been unacceptable . . . to
countries which advocated governmental  non-interference in  pri-
The articles were framed in such a way as to prohibit manifestly serious
offences; there remained sufficient room for manoeuvre [sic] by any signa-
tory wishing to broadcast propaganda . . . Because, by 1936, the success of
the League was seen to be determined by the degree to which its professed
aims coincided with the national interests of its most powerful members,
the success of the Broadcasting Convention depended on the degree to
which those interests were suffering at the hands of hostile propaganda.  In
this respect, even the British Government was forced to reappraise its atti-
tudes towards broadcast propaganda with the dramatic escalation of anti-
British Italian propaganda during the Abyssinian crisis.
PHILIP M. TAYLOR, THE PROJECTION OF BRITAIN: BRITISH OVERSEAS PUBLICITY AND PROPA-
GANDA 1919-1939, 191 (1981).
31. Another claim against the UK is that it was “coerced” into breaching its 1936
Treaty obligations within a few years of signing it — notably by establishing foreign
language radio broadcasting to counter the Italian station’s signals from Bari; by the
plan to use radio Luxembourg to transmit German language broadcast into Germany;
and by the establishment of the Joint Broadcasting Committee. See Nicholas Pronay &
Philip M. Taylor, “An Improper Use of Broadcasting . . . .” The British Government and Clan-
destine Radio Propaganda Operations Against Germany During the Munich Crisis and After, 19
J. CONTEMP. HIST. 357 (1984).
32. West, supra note 16, at 25. R
33. Id.
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vate broadcasting.  Yet Great Britain, for one, signed the
Convention.”34
C. The Treaty and the UN
A United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution (GAR)
in 1946 authorized the Secretary-General of the UN to assume cus-
todial functions over the 1936 Treaty.35  Subsequently, the General
Assembly asked the UN Secretary-General to prepare a draft proto-
col that would include new articles based on GAR 424 (V) and
would preclude contracting parties “from radio broadcasts that
would mean unfair attacks or slanders against other peoples any-
where and in so doing conform strictly to an ethical conduct in the
interest of world peace by reporting facts truly and objectively.”36
The protocol was prepared and circulated but no action was taken
on it.  The General Assembly also asked nations that were not par-
ties to the 1936 Treaty to consider joining.  Some nations, such as
the German Democratic Republic (the former East Germany),
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan agreed.
On July 24, 1985, the 1936 Treaty was denounced by the UK,
followed by France, the Netherlands, and Australia.  Then, on Au-
gust 21, 1985, the United States, which was not a signatory to the
Treaty, issued a statement endorsing the action of the other states:
We welcome the announcements by several western coun-
tries recently that they have denounced the 1936 Interna-
tional Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in
the Cause of Peace.  The Convention has proved to be
singularly ineffective in achieving its stated goal of pro-
moting international understanding.  In acceding to the
Convention, certain Communist states, including the
USSR, have refused to accept the compulsory arbitration
provision of the Convention, but instead have claimed a
right to unilateral retaliation by the deplorable practice of
jamming broadcasts.  That amounts, of course, to a distor-
34. Elizabeth A. Downey, A Historical Survey of the International Regulation of Propa-
ganda, 5 MICH. YBI LEGAL STUD. 341, 344 (1984) (citations omitted).
35. Transfer of Certain Functions, Activities and Assets of the League of Nations, G.A.
Res. 24, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess. (1946).
36. G.A. Res. 841, art. 2(b) U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 22, U.N. Doc
A/2890 (1954).
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tion of the Convention system, with the effect of under-
mining international understandings.  The Convention,
in fact, is inconsistent with commitments undertaken by
the states signatory to the Helsinki Final Act.  Although
the United States is not a signatory to it we believed that
denouncing this Convention serves to promote the free
flow of information among nations which is in the inter-
est of all mankind.37
Nevertheless, the 1936 Treaty remains in force today.38
III. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY
TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
Although the 1936 Treaty remains in force, it is rarely, if ever,
invoked by signatory parties, and has had little effect on interna-
tional behavior.39  As the following examples demonstrate, how-
ever, transnational communications continue to exacerbate
international tensions.  The following section identifies several con-
temporary examples of problems caused by transnational
communications.
37. See Washington News in Brief, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Aug. 22, 1985.
38. G.A. Res. 841, Preambulars 2 & 3, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 22,
U.N. Doc A/2890 (1954).
39. Several practical questions arise concerning the 1936 Treaty’s applicability to
present-day behaviour.  Under Article 6, for example, HCPs are liable for any transmis-
sion that results in a “complaint,” regardless of whether the broadcast is the result of
governmental or non-governmental activity.  1936 Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 6.
Whether the broadcaster is a governmental institution or a private entity, HCPs must
give relevant guidance in an appropriate manner to the broadcaster so that it takes
measures necessary to ensure observance of the rules. Id. The “appropriate manner”
could include issuing instructions, inserting a clause in a constitutive charter, or placing
conditions on licences. Id. Looking forward, one must ask: is this still a valid statement
of the contemporary international law concerning state responsibility for broadcasting?
Second, there is no definition of the term “broadcasting” within the 1936 Treaty.
As it was opened for signature in 1937, it is safe to assume that the “broadcasting”
referred to was understood to apply to radio broadcasting.  Can it — by extension — be
taken to apply to television signals as well?  Could it even be extended to apply to non-
broadcast, computer-generated text or images?  It is generally understood that a broad-
cast signal is one intended for reception by the general public.  Suppose, though, that
the content is delivered by a cable-television channel, pay-per-view platform, or by an
encrypted satellite-television signal.  Are these intended for reception by “the general
public?”  And if not, would the Treaty apply to them?
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A. State-Sponsored Propaganda
In the 1980s, Iran and Iraq were busily beaming TV and radio
propaganda at one another.40  The problem was compounded by
the fact that the jamming counter-measures taken by each of the
two states caused reception problems in neighboring Persian Gulf
States, raising the question as to whether these states had any claim
for monetary damages or other relief under international law.
B. Dramatic/Literary Programs
In 1980 an Independent Broadcasting Authority in the UK
broadcast the television program Death of a Princess.  The program
told the story of the beheading of a Saudi princess accused of adul-
tery.  A diplomatic row broke out between the UK and the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia, resulting in the expulsion of the UK
ambassador from Saudi Arabia.  This is an interesting case study,
not only because of the gravity (in international/diplomatic law
terms) of the reaction, but also because it raises the question of
whether the fact that the program was not transmitted to the of-
fended country makes (or should make) any difference to the al-
leged tort.
In 1977, a Saudi Arabian princess and her 19-year-old lover
were publicly executed.  British journalist Anthony Thomas investi-
gated this contemporary example of Middle Eastern jurisprudence;
he then transformed his research into this 1980 docudrama.  Su-
zanne Abou Taleb played the unfortunate woman in the title of this
unvarnished dramatization.  The government of Saudi Arabia de-
manded that the film not be shown in Great Britain, but the BBC
refused to buckle under.  Showing the film on British TV led to a
crisis in diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain.  “In
the U.S., government pressure (Warren Christopher then State Sec-
retary) ‘appealed’ to the network and Exxon withdrew their adver-
tisements causing PBS to cancel further broadcasts.”41
During February 1987, the U.S.-based American Broadcasting
Corp. (ABC) screened a mini-series entitled Amerika.  It purported
40. Sajid Rizvi, The Jacksons Boogie for Iraqi Propaganda Machine, UNITED PRESS INT’L,
May 11, 1984.
41. Decapitation by the Sword or the Axe, at http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/
Studio/3015/decap.htm.
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to show what life would be like in the United States under Soviet
occupation, and featured a para-military force called the “UN Spe-
cial Services Unit.”  Opposition to the program was expressed by
the Secretary-General of the UN, because of the use of a UN-style
peace-keeping force, and by Pravda, which described the series as “a
deliberate act of psychological warfare.”42
On the Wings of Eagles was an American mini-series shown in the
United States and slated to air in the UK.  The BBC, however, with-
drew the show from its schedule on the ground that it might pro-
voke a reaction against UK citizens in Iran, as it coincided with a
particularly tense time for relations between the UK and Iran.43
Australia’s ABC TV started to transmit a “soap-drama [called
“Embassy”] in 1991 set in and around the Australian embassy of a
small fictional country in South-East Asia (presumably somewhere
near Thailand or Malaysia).”44  The country was called Ragaan.
“The Malaysian government claimed to be the intended target of
the series and took great offence to it, causing relations with Austra-
lia (and particularly the ABC) to be strained for years.”45
C. News and Current Affairs
In 1988, the London Times reported that the BBC’s flagship
current affairs program, Panorama, had transmitted an item con-
cerning Rajiv Ghandi.46  The Indian High Commission in London
protested the program.  A visit to India by the Secretary of State for
Transport was cancelled.  The Minister of State at the UK Foreign
Office told a congressional dinner party in Dehli that the program
was “thoroughly bad . . . unbalanced . . . grossly unfair.”47
Another row (albeit, on this occasion, not as the result of a
television program) erupted between the UK and Malaysia over the
42. Ivor Davis, Spectrum: Starry war on the screen, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 28,
1987. See also, Guy Lometti, AMERIKA: U.S. Miniseries, http://www.museum.tv/
archives/etv/A/htmlA/amerika/amerika.htm.
43. Shyama Perera & Gareth Perry, Diplomatic Row Makes BBC Axe Iranian Series,
THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 15, 1987.
44. Marc Pasquin, Ragaan (Feb. 9, 1996), http://flagspot.net/flags/fic_emba.
html.
45. Id.
46. Michael Hamlyn, British Minister Attacks BBC’s Gandhi Profile, THE TIMES
(LONDON), Apr. 20, 1988.
47. Id.
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claim that the Sunday Times libeled Malaysia in an article.  The Ma-
laysian Deputy Home Minister said, “We have been led to believe
that insiders could have worked with the British media to smear the
image of the country.  The despicable acts of giving false reports to
the foreign media could be viewed as treachery.”48  The dispute
arose out of a report in the Sunday Times, which alleged that a UK
construction company had been involved in negotiations to offer
“bribes” to Malaysian politicians, including the Malaysian Prime
Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamed.  In response, Malaysia instituted a
ban on giving public sector contracts to British companies.  Though
the ban had the option of being lifted during July 1994, the loss of
future business contracts and the consequent effect on the UK
economy and jobs was a worry.  The Sunday Times responded with
an article entitled Public’s Right to Know in which they argued that
“[t]rying to minimise these risks by expecting the British press not
to reveal anything nasty about doing business with Malaysia is unac-
ceptable, especially when what the newspapers have been revealing
is very much in the public interest.”49
In another example, a dispute erupted when a Greek Public
Order Minister, Yiorgos Voulgarakis, had a phone conversation
with the British Ambassador to Greece, David Madden, concerning
an online version of an article by London Times journalist Laura
Peek concerning an effort to breach Greek security precautions in
the run up to the 2004 Olympic Games.  The Minister was quoted
as saying that the Time’s behavior in trying to prove that the security
arrangements were inadequate was “a little strange.”50  Greek me-
dia described it more trenchantly: “persistent negative reporting,”51
“completely distorting the facts,”52 and Alter TV station said the
real purpose was to “denigrate [Greece’s] Olympic preparations.”53
Another row began when the UK Independent carried an item
detailing the German Foreign Minister’s opinion that some of the
48. Ian Katz, Malaysia Threatens Press Ban, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 7, 1994, at 2.
49. Public’s Right to Know, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, in Features.
50. Public Order Minister Warns Foreign Reporters Olympic Games Security No Game,
ATHENS NEWS AGENCY, May 13, 2004.
51. John Carr, Olympic Report Angers Athens, THE TIMES ONLINE, May 14, 2004,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1109704,00.html.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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UK media carry impressions of Germany that are “more than three
generations out of date . . . .  My children are 20 and 25 and when
they watch Germany in some of the British media, they think this is
a picture they have never seen in their whole lifetimes.”54  In an
interview with BBC Radio 4, the Minister is quoted as saying that
“people to people, there is a problem and I think the media are
playing a very important role.”55 The Guardian, too, had an article
on the matter in the context of the November 2004 visit of the
Queen of England:
Fed up with Britain’s continuing obsession with Hitler,
the Germany embassy in London came up last month
with a novel plan.  Why not invite a group of English his-
tory teachers to Germany, put them up in a five-star hotel,
throw in an opera, and hope that their positive experi-
ence of modern Germany rubs off on what they teach? . . .
The unusual invitation followed an attack last week by
Germany’s foreign minister Joschka Fischer, who accused
the British media of perpetuating a “goose-stepping” im-
age of Germany that was three generations out of date.56
D. Light Entertainment/Comedy Programs
In February 1987, a German comedy television show carried an
item showing the Ayatollah of Iran receiving a gift of ladies’ under-
wear.57  As a result, Iran Air cancelled its flights from Teheran to
Frankfurt, Iran closed (albeit temporarily) its consulate office in
Frankfurt, and two German diplomats were expelled from Iran.58
54. Why Our View of Germany is Locked in a 60-Year Timewarp; Britain’s Obsession with
the War Colours Its Attitudes Towards Its [sic], THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Oct. 21, 2004,
at 12; Richard Beeston, For You British the War has Never Ended, Says Fischer, THE TIMES
ONLINE, Oct. 21, 2004, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,173-13
20331,00.html.
55. Luke Harding, Foreign Minister Blames UK Media for Harming Ties With Goose-
stepping Stereotype of Germans, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 21, 2004, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/britain/article/0,2763,1331975,00.html.
56. Luke Harding, Germans Lay on 5-Star Visit to Lure British Teachers Away from Nazi
Image of History, THE GUARDIAN ONLINE, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ger-
many/article/0,2763,1336072,00.html.
57. Iran Protests W. German TV Joke, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS, Mar. 6, 1987, § B3,
at 137; Iran Envoy Demands Kohl Apology for TV Show Mocking Kohmeini, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1987, at 17.
58. Id.
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In another example, two Australian diplomats — a trade com-
missioner and an administrative officer — were expelled from Te-
heran after a sketch on the ABC comedy show The Dingo Principle.
The item featured the Ayatollah and ended with him threatening to
blow up the world.  The Iranian authorities claimed that the show
defamed Islam and Islamic values.59
In another example, on September 28, 2003, the Japan Times
reported that the Hungarian television station TV2 was broadcast-
ing a show that angered the local Japanese community in Hungary.
The program, “Micuko — the world in slanted eyes, feature[d] a
Hungarian TV reporter in a black hairpiece and fake teeth who
passed herself off as a goggled-eyed Japanese woman to ambush
and interview Hungarian celebrities.”  The Japanese Embassy filed a
protest with the broadcaster, TV2, and the Hungarian Foreign Min-
istry.  “TV2 . . . decided to suspend the show for three months.”60
The program was to return under a new name.61
E. Conclusions
In conclusion, it seems clear from the previous illustrations
that the genres of programming that have caused strained relations
and, in some cases, serious international reactions and responses —
expulsion of diplomats, suspension of air services, and trade embar-
goes — are not confined to the “political” or “ideological” in the
narrow, classical sense.  Indeed, the reach and impact of so-called
“light entertainment” shows means that they are important, and will
arguably become more important, as generators of transnational
tensions and complaints.  This category also includes the increas-
ingly popular “faction” type of show, which, by blending fact and
fiction, can easily be perceived as an illegitimate re-writing of his-
tory by the group or state to which it refers.  Such history can be
quite recent, as demonstrated by the faction dramas about the Falk-
land/Malvinas war, or the Irish troubles transmitted in the UK.
The range of broadcast output that may potentially cause upset
59. TV Show Protest, NATIONWIDE NEW PTY LTD., May 6, 1987.
60. Hungary TV Station to Suspend Japan-mocking Prime Time Show, JAPAN ECON. NEW-
SWIRE, May 15, 2003; Hungary TV Cuts Controversial Show, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003,
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030928b1.htm.
61. See id.
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and, therefore, arguably should be provided for by international
law is almost without limit.
IV. THE ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS CONCERNING
DEFAMATORY TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
The 1936 Treaty does not constitute general international law
regarding the norms applicable to allegedly defamatory transna-
tional communications.  Obviously, the rules specified in the Con-
vention are not customary international law.  Do they, however,
express the opinio iuris of states?  Certainly, there is now a clear di-
vide between the opinio of the current signatories to the 1936 Treaty
and those that have denounced it. What, if any, are the current
norms of international law in this area?
Historically, the law relating to defamatory propaganda is
rather vague.  A useful summary, at least up to the date of its publi-
cation, is offered by John Whitton, a figure of some importance in
the recent history of transnational communication.62  Whitton dis-
tinguishes between defamatory, seditious, and war-mongering prop-
aganda.  This article is mainly interested in the first category, which
“consider[s] the words used by governments and officials, and to
condemn those considered sufficiently injurious because of the
damage that they are likely to cause either to other states, or to the
international community, or to both.”63  The law varies according
to who the speaker is — government or a “private” entity.  There is,
in addition, a problematic category:
[W]hen the actor is neither the state nor an individual,
but an organization under a greater or less degree of gov-
ernmental direction.  If financed, or otherwise really con-
trolled by the state, the acts of such organization should
certainly stand in the same category with regard to the
resulting legal consequences.64
As regards the UK, an interesting question arises, on Whitton’s cri-
teria, concerning the BBC.  Because it is publicly financed, does this
62. John B. Whitton, Propaganda and International Law, Academie de Droit Inter-
national, Recueil des Cours (1948).
63. Id. at 607.
64. Id. at 607.
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mean that international law should treat its acts as the acts of the
UK?
Whitton attempts to answer these problems by describing vari-
ous fact situations that could possibly give rise to liability under in-
ternational law.  They are quite complex.  First, if a verbal attack is
made by State A, or by one of its officials acting intra vires, an of-
fense is committed.  Second, if a verbal attack is made by a non-state
entity, and the object of the attack is one of State B’s diplomats,
then State A’s responsibility may be engaged.  In the same situation,
but with an attack on a foreign sovereign or head of state Whitton’s
fact situations require a national law making such an attack an of-
fense, however, if the verbal attack contemplated the murder of the
head of state there need be no specific national law.  Third, attack-
ing State B as such does not constitute an offense known to interna-
tional law.  There are, however, some national laws that do deal
with this on the basis that it affects “friendly relations” between
states.  Finally, if the attack is against the policies of State B, Whit-
ton argues that “if the object of the criticism is a clear violation of
an international duty created either by treaty or general interna-
tional law, this criticism is justified; even more, in some circum-
stances, it may even be the duty of foreign states to protest against
such violation.”65  This last point is interesting and should be devel-
oped further.  What is the scope of any violation of an international
duty before a criticism is justified?  Does Whitton mean all interna-
tional law duties, or only some?  How should states manifest their
criticism?  Is criticism the only, or the only reasonable, state reac-
tion? Though these questions remain unanswered, Whitton’s fact
situations provide an excellent starting point toward the develop-
ment of more substantive international law.
The basic question for international law is whether another
state’s adverse reaction towards allegedly defamatory programming
should be considered legitimate at all.  If so, this might leave the
door open for an official agency located in the transmitting state to
be involved in either taking action against an “infringing” broad-
caster or having authority over any impending broadcast.  For ex-
ample, an official agency in the transmitting state could call for
revision, postponement, or cancellation of a broadcast.  As has
65. Id. at 608.
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been noted, this would have implications for broadcasters’ freedom
of expression.  The problem is further complicated by the fact that
the very notion of a transmitting and/or receiving state may not
always be appropriate.  The paradigmatic notion of hostile/defama-
tory propaganda involving communication from the territory of
state A to state B is not always realistic.  As has been seen in the
Death of a Princess illustration, dissemination (“publication”) does
not always require the transmission of the signal carrying the alleg-
edly defamatory matter from the territory of state A to state B.66
It is suggested that there are two differing circumstances po-
tentially giving rise to two different international law norms.  The
first is that a complaint or reaction is only justified in principle
when and insofar as material is intended to cross a state boundary
into the territory of the “receiving” state.  The second is that the
nature or content of the material may per se legitimately trigger a
complaint/reaction.  Two separate scenarios help illustrate and dis-
tinguish the different legal implication of these circumstances.
First, where the signal is transmitted from State A by the sender to
the intended recipients in State B (which might be dubbed the
electronic Trail Smelter conception).67  Second, where the item
complained of is not intentionally transmitted from the territory of
State A, but is viewed by representatives of State B, who raise the
issue with State A, even though it is possible that nobody in State B
saw the allegedly offensive item.  In this latter example, the ground
of complaint would be, presumably, that an unjustifiable mis-
perception about State B was being created in the minds of those in
State A, which might create or lead to unfriendly relations between
the two peoples.  The difference between these two scenarios was
encapsulated neatly during the 1948 UN Conference on Freedom
of Information.  Whitton wrote that the principal aim of the meet-
66. See supra text accompanying note 41. R
67. The Trail Smelter Arbitration cases involved transborder air pollution.  Nox-
ious smoke containing sulfur dioxide emissions emanating from a Canadian zinc smelt-
ing complex damaged crops in the United States.  Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v.
Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 and 1941).  Scholars suggest that, while the Trail Smelter
Arbitration is regarded as a significant milestone in international environmental law,
the arbitration can be used as a model for other transborder international disputes. See,
e.g., Daniel Barstow Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission’s
Study of “International Liability,” 80 AM. J. INT’L. L. 305 (1986); Trail Smelter Arbitration,
1938/1941, at http://www.law.uidaho.edu/default.aspx?pid=66516.
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ing was to seek “the improvement in the means of sending informa-
tion across frontiers.”68  Resolution 2, however, states that the
conference:
[C]ondemns solemnly all propaganda either designed or
likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and all distor-
tion and falsification of news through whatever channels,
whether private or governmental, since such activities can
only promote misunderstanding and mistrust between
the people of the world and thereby endanger the lasting
peace which the United Nations is consecrated to
maintain.69
The Resolution makes no explicit reference to dissemination across
frontiers.
The examples raise the vexing question of whether there is or
should be any norm regarding the existence and scope of a right or
duty of a state to prescribe a right or duty to prevent the transmis-
sion of an item, if it is known in advance that there is a substantial
or real risk of the serious displeasure (or worse) of another state, or
to global peace and security in general.
One of the claims this article makes is that even if the rules
could have been stated clearly at one time, recent and contempo-
rary developments have thrown the matter into doubt.
V. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT INTERNATIONAL NORMS
Although this article suggests that a major task of articulating
the contemporary international norms concerning transnational
communication in general, and defamatory or slanderous commu-
nications in particular, remains to be done, at another level the is-
sue of the appropriate method to deal with the problem of such
communications needs to be addressed.  A number of differing
mechanisms and methods have been addressed including: bilateral
agreements (e.g., Grandin); administrative remedies (e.g., Whit-
ton); changes in attitude coupled with more or better sources and
68. John B. Whitton, The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and The
Movement Against International Propaganda, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 73 (1949).
69. Id. at 75 n.9 (quoting G.A. Res. 2, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/Conf.
6/C.1/19 (1948)).
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flow of information (e.g., the official U.S. approach); the recall of
the 1948 UN Conference on Freedom of Information; the creation
of a supervisory international media council and more rigorous gui-
dance and enforcement of conditions in broadcasters’ charters, li-
censes etc; strengthening of domestic obligations — either in
fulfillment of international obligations or as a unilateral initiative;
and monitoring.
Whitton was concerned with articulating both the rules con-
cerning international defamatory propaganda and how evidence re-
garding such transmissions could be gathered, albeit in a slightly
different context.  He became one of the seminal figures in the cre-
ation of a number of so-called “listening centers,” which were set up
as the Second World War got under way and the role of radio as a
political weapon became clearer.70  Some years later, in 1958, U.S.
President Eisenhower addressed the UN General Assembly and
made the following proposal: “I believe that this Assembly should
. . . consider means for monitoring the radio broadcasts directed
70. In February 1938, John Whitton, Director of the Geneva Research Centre in
February 1938, met with Ed Murrow, European representative of CBS, and became im-
pressed with the use of radio as an international political weapon.  In late 1938, the
School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University set up a committee,
which included Whitton, to propose how short-wave radio propaganda should be stud-
ied.  The Rockefeller Foundation financed the project and the Director of the Institute
for Advanced Study donated 69 Alexander Street.  For eight hours per day, six days per
week, a representative sample of newscasts and topical talks broadcast from Berlin,
London, Rome, Paris, and Moscow were received, recorded, and transcribed by the
Centre.  Biweekly digests and summaries were prepared and widely circulated.  During
the 1930s, international broadcasting escalated for political reasons. See Harold N.
Graves, Jr., Propaganda in the Air, 2 PRINCETON U. LIBR. CHRON. 91 (1941).  Various
listening posts were created, including those by the Chicago Tribune and the UK Royal
Institute of International Affairs in the spring of 1939.  After the outbreak of World War
II, official and semi-official posts were set up in Sweden, France, Britain, and Germany.
In the third month of the war, John Whitton created the Princeton Listening Cen-
tre.  This would be the first of several systematic U.S. initiatives.  This creation of the
Stanford Listening Centre followed in September 1940.  In March 1941, the FCC an-
nounced that it would “establish a 24-hour watch on all short-wave broadcasts radiated
to the Western Hemisphere” Id. at 93.
The Princeton Centre, created by Professor John Whitton, lasted until June 1941.
Thereafter, its functions were transferred to the FCC.  In total, twenty Listening Centre
Reports were published between December 1939 and July 1941. See PROPAGANDA BY
SHORT WAVE (Hardwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton, eds., 1942).
As noted above, the decision was taken to establish a Monitoring Service of the
FCC to monitor short-wave radio transmissions on a much grander scale than could be
achieved by the Princeton Centre.
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across national frontiers in the troubled Near East area.  It should
then examine complaints from these nations which consider their
national security jeopardised by external propaganda.”71  In com-
menting on this proposal, Whitton urged that monitoring “would
appear to have great potentialities, and deserves the most careful
consideration.”72  What really impressed Whitton was that, in com-
parison to the Second World War efforts, there was novelty and sig-
nificance in entrusting the task to a universal body.  Would there be
any interest or appetite for such a universal body today (ignoring
the “covert” monitoring that goes on by entities as Echelon73)?
Of course, methods must be related to the problem they are
designed to address.  Are the methods mentioned above equally ap-
plicable to the various forms of transnational communication, par-
ticularly the new information and communications technologies?
The history of communication makes it clear that the modes of
transnational defamation have assumed as many different forms as
have media of communication.
VI. CONCLUSION
The major issue raised by this paper concerns the articulation
of the norms concerning transnational defamatory communication,
as spelt out by classic jurists such as Whitton.  Though much has
been written about this question, there are still unanswered ques-
tions.  Are such descriptions a valid description of such rules and,
more importantly, a description that is valid in today’s world?  A
1993 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE)74 seminar on “the free media” demonstrated just how diffi-
cult it is to achieve a philosophical, intellectual, or political agree-
ment even between the United States and the two branches of the
European family.75
71. John B. Whitton, Radio Propaganda — A Modest Proposal, 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 739,
745 (1958).
72. Id.
73. Nail McKay, Lawmakers Raise Questions About International Spy Network, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/05/cyber/
articles/27network.html.
74. Now the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
75.  DAVID GOLDBERG, FREE MEDIA: REPORT ON THE CSCE HUMAN DIMENSION SEMI-
NAR ON FREE MEDIA (WARSAW, 2-5 NOVEMBER 1993) (1994). See also, CSCE/ODIHR
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A re-examination of the opinio iuris of states is now called for.
Nothing less is adequate for the world as it enters the much-her-
alded era of the global information society.  There has, undoubt-
edly, been a change in the international consensus (such as it is)
during the last fifty years, albeit that, in the light of the CSCE expe-
rience mentioned above, there might not be a global opinio iuris at
all.  Downey has considered the impact on the new global order of
the “new state,” or in other words, “post-colonial polities.”  She
notes that no Third World state has opted to accede to the 1936
Convention, stating that the “Third World has preferred to draft
new agreements rather than try to enforce old ones.”76  Further,
“[t]he developing counties do not consistently favour either side of
the debate [between East and West]; their goal is to obtain aid to
develop their own media systems and to active more control over
what the world media reports about their countries.”77  Their aim is
twofold:  first, an expanded definition of propaganda which em-
braces the idea not only of intentionally hostile messages, but also
of “technically accurate but unbalanced or one-sided information
that leads to an inaccurate, incomplete understanding”;78 and sec-
ond, an effective global right of correction.  It has become increas-
ingly difficult to claim that there is an undifferentiated,
homogeneous Third World view about anything, including transna-
tional communication.  In the “new world disorder,” “third world-
ism,” along with many other nostrums of past decades, may have to
be rethought, or even jettisoned as no longer analytically useful.
Resolution 26 of the 1948 Conference on Freedom of Informa-
tion calls for the “appointment of a committee of jurists to study the
laws of libel, and to formulate a body of fundamental rules and
principles on this subject, so closely connected with certain types of
international propaganda, but in the opinion of delegates, not
ready for consideration without further research.”79  Forty-seven
years later, the recommendation contained in this resolution still
Consolidated Summary, at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1993/11/1769_en.
pdf?PHPSESSID=62e1c7b0926d8a3543e9e4043e71cedb.
76. Downey, supra note 34, at 350, 359 n.81. R
77. Id. at 349.
78. Id.
79. John B. Whitton, supra note 68, at 75. R
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remains valid.  Implementing Resolution 26 remains unfinished
business for the international legal community.80
80. The World Summit on the Information Society in Tunis in November 2005
would have been a golden opportunity for such a reconsideration of the fundamental
rules of libel.  Sadly, this issue does not seem to have been on the agenda.
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